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STUDENT COMMENTS
The March on the Spanish Sahara: A Test of
International Law
On November 6, 1975, 350,000 Moroccan civilians armed
only with the Koran, crossed the border into the Spanish Sa-
hara. The march was halted after only three days and six miles,
but even as the Moroccans returned home, suffering from the
rigors of the unwelcoming desert, the uniqueness and audacity
of King Hassan's venture had taken the world aback, and Mo-
rocco's claim to the Spanish Sahara had been indelibly marked
in history.
The march was not only a political and historical event,
however. It was also a test of, and a challenge to, international
law. After a brief historical and political background, this com-
ment will explore the responses of international legal institu-
tions to the situation, and the applicability of several principles
of international law to the event-among them, self-
determination, aggression, and coercion-and the psychologi-
cal and cultural factors which deeply affect the application of
international law to a situation of this kind. Through this ex-
amination, the strengths and weaknesses of international law
as an ordering of world dynamics may be, to some extent, re-
vealed.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Spanish Sahara, 105,000 square miles of desert in
northwestern Africa, has a total population variously estimated
at 60,000, 70,000 and 75,000. The majority of the population are
nomadic Arab-Berbers, who wander across the borders of Mo-
rocco, Mauritania, and Algeria. There is a small sedentary
group of Black farmers in the northern oases, and a European
population, in 1971, of 16,648.'
The area has been included in Morocco's territorial claims
ever since that country achieved independence in 1956. In fact,
Morocco has, at one time or another, claimed Mauritania, the
1. Enahoro, Imbroglio in the Sahara, AFRICA, Dec. 1975, at 13 [hereinafter cited
as Enahoro].
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Spanish Sahara, parts of Algeria, and the small Spanish terri-
tories of Ceuta, Melitta and Ifni, to be "historically, ethnically,
and politically Moroccan."' The boundaries which developed
as a result of French and Spanish colonization were viewed as
artificially imposed on a homogeneous area. Mauritanian in-
dependence in 1960, a border war with Algeria in 1965, and
the ceding of Ifni to Morocco in 1969 settled some of the
territorial disputes. However, Morocco remained firm in its
claim, as sporadic skirmishes in the area for the past twenty
years indicate, that the territory of the Spanish Sahara should
be restored to Morocco; at the time of the French conquest at
the end of the nineteenth century, the area was ruled by a
Moroccan governor.3
Mauritania's claim to the area, as heir of the Moors who
lost their huge empire in the eighth century, could be viewed
as even stronger than Morocco's.' Since 1936, when Spain
began its occupation of the area, the colonial power has
vacillated in its desire for the territory. The realization, in 1964,
that there was no oil in the area brought Spain to the point of
negotiations with Morocco for a settlement of the dispute.5 But
suddenly, in the next year, no one was willing to give up; the
Spanish Sahara's vast phosphate deposits were discovered.
This economic issue is the main reason for the current
crisis. Morocco is the world's largest exporter of phosphates,
which are used in the manufacture of fertilizer, and the indus-
try constitutes more than half of Morocco's foreign exchange
revenue. A competing industry in the Spanish Sahara would
seriously affect the Moroccan industry. The territory has re-
serves of 1.7 billion tons of high grade ore.' For the same reason,
Spain immediately tightened its grip on the area, and began
exploiting the resource; Mauritania quickly saw an opportunity
to aid its own economy; and Algeria, which has no territorial
claims to the Sahara, strongly voiced its opposition to a Moroc-
can takeover.
2. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1956, at 19, col. 3.
3. N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1957, at 26, col. 3.
4. Enahoro, supra note 1, at 10.
5. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1964, at 74, col. 5.
6. Enahoro, supra note 1, at 9.
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II. THE CURRENT CRISIS
In September of 1970, the leaders of Morocco, Algeria, and
Mauritania applied diplomatic pressure to Spain to vacate the
territory, and to agree to a United Nations-supervised referen-
dum for the people of the territory.7 Since that time, the claims
and counterclaims have intensified. Finally, King Hassan of
Morocco appealed to the United Nations, in 1974, to arrange
the return of the Spanish Sahara to Morocco. The United Na-
tions sent observers to study the situation. Subsequently, Has-
san realized that a referendum might go against Morocco, and
proposed that the dispute be taken to the International Court
of Justice. The Court began deliberations on the question of
whether the Spanish Sahara is a no-man's land, or a legitimate
Moroccan (or Mauritanian) territory.'
Spain requested United Nations observers, reserved the
right for an emergency Security Council session if peace in the
area was threatened, and promised to set a deadline for with-
drawal.' The Security Council met and adopted a unanimous
resolution calling on all concerned "to avoid any unilateral
action which might further increase the tension in the area."
It also requested Mr. Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations, to intensify consultations. The Secretary-
General proposed a six-month cooling-off period during which
the United Nations could create a temporary administration in
the area.'0
On October 16, 1975, the International Court of Justice
announced its decision that neither Morocco nor Mauritania
had any territorial sovereignty over the area. The court did say
that when the territory was colonized by Spain, the rulers of
Morocco and what is now Mauritania had the allegiance of
some of the territory's nomadic tribes." Immediately after the
Court's decision came down, King Hassan announced that he
would lead the march into the Spanish Sahara, saying that "no
tyrant, no matter how faithless, would give orders to fire on
350,000 unarmed persons."'"
7. B. CURRAN & J. SCHROCK, AREA HANDBOOK FOR MAURITANIA 99 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as CURRAN].
8. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1974, at 4, col. 4.
9. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1975, at 7, col. 1.
10. Enahoro, supra note 1, at 11.
11. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1975, at 8, col. 4.
12. Id.
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The march, superbly orchestrated and enthusiastically
supported by Moroccans, immediately began to pay off for
Morocco, although it was abruptly halted because of a Spanish
force inside the territory and the threat of Spanish minefields.
By November 14, Spain had agreed to abandon the Spanish
Sahara by February 28, 1976, and to share its administration
with Morocco and Mauritania until then, at which time the
two neighboring countries would jointly administer the coun-
try.'" However, Algeria has never accepted this agreement
which also bypassed United Nations efforts to effect a self-
determination referendum. There have been skirmishes be-
tween Algerian regulars, Algerian-backed Saharan guerrillas,
and Moroccan troops since the agreement, culminating in Mo-
rocco and Mauritania breaking off diplomatic ties with Algeria
on March 7, 1976.1' On February 26, two days ahead of sched-
ule, the immediate goal of the march was finally accom-
plished-Spain withdrew from the territory now known as the
Western Sahara.
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
Although the legal implications of the Sahara incident are
closely interrelated, they will be separated into four groups for
greater ease of analysis: self-determination; aggression and
coercion; "non-legal" aspects of international law; and interna-
tional organizations.
A. Self-Determination
The history of the principle of self-determination is bound
up with the doctrine of the French Revolution that government
should be based on the will of the people, and if the people are
not content with the form of government they should be able
to change it as they wish. This doctrine "had since the very
beginning the character of a threat to the legitimacy of the
established order."'" As a corollary to popular sovereignty, the
doctrine was also related to peaceful change. Territorial trans-
fers between sovereign nations should be guided and arbitrated
by the people affected by the transfers. As this theory is vague
and imprecise, and particularly because of the revolutionary
13. N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1975, at 1, col. 2.
14. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1976, at 7, col. 1.
15. R. SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as SUREDA].
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character of popular sovereignty, self-determination has been
considered by some merely a political concept, and not a legal
right.'8
The modern use of the concept became pronounced near
the end of World War I. Although not mentioning the actual
word "self-determination", which was first used in a 1916 Bri-
tish memorandum, Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points Ad-
dress of January 18, 1918 gave great impetus to the principle.
The Allies themselves, however, "accepted self-determination
only insofar as it applied to the disintegration and dissolution
of the German, Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and former Rus-
sian empires. There was no intention of applying the principle
to their own colonies and subject peoples."'" The phrase was
not referred to in the peace treaties of 1919, nor in the Covenant
of the League of Nations, but was reincarnated in the Charter
of the United Nations.
Article 1(2) of the Charter expressly refers to "the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples." Article
55, dealing with international economic and social cooperation,
also refers to self-determination as a principle rather than a
right. In Article 73, a non-self-governing territory is defined as
one "whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-
government" (emphasis added). Although self-determination
is contained in the Charter as a principle, it is not a legal right,
and was not listed as one in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948."8
Self-determination did not become a significant working
principle of the United Nations until the 1960's, by which time
the world order had significantly changed. In 1948, there were
only three self-governing African nations-Ethiopia, Liberia,
and the Union of South Africa.'9 Throughout the Sixties, sev-
eral colonies gained independence every year. The Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples 0 was the first of several General Assembly resolutions
16. Id. at 25. For a thorough treatment of the doctrine and the literature dealing
with it, see U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
17. Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1975 DET. COL. L.
REV. 71, at 71 [hereinafter cited as Friedlander].
18. G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAOR Supp. 2, U.N. Doc. A/555 (1948).
19. Friedlander, supra note 17, at 84.
20. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). The
Declaration reads as follows:
1976
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responding to the change in circumstances. The clear purpose
of this document is to brand all colonialism as illegitimate, and
contrary to the right, now not merely the principle, of self-
determination. Whether this pronouncement affected interna-
tional law in a strict sense is debatable, but it was certainly an
indicator of the change in "the entire setting and international
frame of mind in which the world's colonial-or anti-
colonial-affairs are conducted."'" Another indicator is the fact
that nine states, including the United States, the United King-
dom, France, and Portugal, the major colonial powers of the
past, abstained in the unanimous adoption of the resolution.
Where such a body of doubt exists, "the existence of a rule of
international law cannot lightly be assumed."22
Problems of definition make the application of this, and
later resolutions, difficult. Neither "people" nor "nation" has
any generally accepted meaning, so that the entity endowed
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploi-
tation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to
the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion
of world peace and co-operation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their eco-
nomic, social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social, or educational preparedness
should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against
dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peace-
fully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity
of their national territory shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing
Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independ-
ence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any
conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will
and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed, or color, in order to
enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national
unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-
interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sover-
eign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.
21. R. EMERSON, SELF-DETERMINATION REVISITED IN THE ERA OF DECOLONIZATION 28
(1964) [hereinafter cited as EMERSON].
22. Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L. L. 459, 462 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Emerson].
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with the right, and the precise goal toward which self-
determination is directed, are both unclear. However, a
formula for self-determination has been developed through
these resolutions:
23
(1) All dependent peoples are entitled to freedom;
(2) The peoples so entitled are defined in terms of the existing
colonial territories, each of which contains a nation;
(3) Once such a people has come to independence, no residual
right of self-determination remains with any group within it or
cutting across its frontiers.
The last part of the formula was firmly established in 1960 by
Resolution 1514,24 which stated that "an attempt aimed at the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the terri-
torial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." There-
fore, the right of self-determination can only be exercised once;
the ethnic diversity of the peoples of the new state is no longer
acceptable as a justification for self-determination. This caveat
has served as a protection for the new elite of Africa against the
threat of a Biafra-like secession. 25 The most recent major Gen-
eral Assembly resolution on the subject, a Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, 26 reaffirmed the "one-time-only" rule.27
In December 1966, two international human rights
covenants-the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights-contributed to the continuing process of
formulation of the principle. In identical language, they state
that "[all] peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status
and freely preserve their economic, social, and cultural
development."28 Although stated as a right, the Covenants do
23. EMERSON, supra note 21, at 28.
24. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
25. Note, The United Nations, Self-Determination and the Namibia Opinions, 82
YALE L. J. 533, 541 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note].
26. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
27. Friedlander, supra note 17, at 79. For the view that self-determination in-
cludes the right of secession, see Nayar, Self-Determination Beyond the Colonial Con-
text: Biafra in Retrospect, 10 TEXAS INT'L L. J. 321 (1975).
28. G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
See Friedlander, supra note 17, at 77.
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not recognize self-determination as an absolute, continuing
right. As international covenants are considered authoritative
interpretations of the Charter, these add to the debate as to
whether self-determination is now a legal right. 9 By its
Charter, resolutions, and Covenants, the United Nations has
formalized self-determination as an important principle of in-
ternational law. It pressured colonial powers to give up their
colonies in the Sixties and Seventies.39 But the present selective
self-determination may still be more of a political doctrine
than a legal right. A succinct summary of the present effective-
ness of the concept is that it has
historically depended upon the particular area and the particular
peoples involved. It has never been universally applied and is
more an ideological weapon than a practical political device. As
a general principle of international law it has secured wide-
spread acceptance. As a fundamental human right it is even now
a questionable doctrine."
One important additional problem with the doctrine, crucial to
the Sahara situation, is the treatment of very small territories,
or mini-states, when the question of self-determination arises.
Traditionally, it has been assumed that an entity must
meet four criteria before it can be said to be a state: (a) a
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government;
and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
32
With the decrease in the number of large colonies, mini-
territories, which often do not fulfill all of these requirements,
constitute the majority of non-self-governing territories. Upon
becoming free, mini-states do not resemble the classic nation-
state. They need services from the outside world, technical and
political advice, and status, involving at least direct access to
the United Nations, if not membership. 33 There is some feeling
that, having rejected trusteeship and colonialism, these mini-
29. Friedlander, supra note 17, at 81.
30. Note, supra note 25, at 558.
31. Friedlander, supra note 17, at 91. For an application of the doctrine to the
Bangladesh conflict, see Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic
Tale of Two Cities-Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM.
J. INT'L L. 321 (1972).
32. Cohen, The Concept of Statehood in United Nations Practice, 109 U. PA. L.
REV. 1127, 1129 (1961).
33. Fisher, The Participation of Microstates in International Affairs, 62 AM. Soc.
INT'L L. PROC. 164, 167 (1968).
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states should choose a new form of association with the United
Nations, in lieu of independence." At the present time, how-
ever, the U.N. Committee of 24, which deals with such ques-
tions, has "strongly tended to equate the proper exercise of the
right of self-determination with a decision for independence."
35
A Mini-State Committee, established by the United Nations in
1969, has held no meetings since 1971, an indication of the fact
that the issue of mini-state membership in the United Nations
has lost its urgency for the present; it is thought that many
small territories will desire a status less than full independ-
ence, and membership.3 1 This does not, however, speak to the
question of how mini-territories are to be dealt with, whether
they desire independence or not.
The United Nations has expressed its desire that the
choice of self-determination be free and informed. As to free-
dom of choice, the United Nations has supervised plebiscites,
or attempted to determine ex post facto the validity of elections
bearing on the issue. An informed choice is much more difficult
to implement, the colonial powers being reluctant to let the
United Nations discuss the matter with the inhabitants of their
territories. 37 The process of self-determination for the Spanish
Sahara, as revealed by formal resolutions and informal activi-
ties, is a good case study of the application of the principle to
a complex and difficult situation.
By its Resolution 2072 of December 15, 1965, the General
Assembly requested the Government of Spain
to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of
the territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domina-
tion and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems
relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories.U
In Resolution 2354 of December 19, 1967, the Assembly invited
the Administering Power to determine at the earliest possible
date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people
of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of
34. Bowett, Self-Determination and Political Rights in the Developing Countries,
60 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 129, 135 (1966).
35. Emerson, supra note 22, at 470.
36. Gunter, The Problems of Ministate Membership in the United Nations Sys-
tem: Recent Attempts Towards a Solution, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 464, 484 (1973).
37. Rapoport, The Participation of Ministates in International Affairs, 62 AM.
Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 155, 158 (1968).
38. Esfandiary, Comments, 62 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 164, 172 (1968).
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Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party, the pro-
cedures for the holding of a referendum under U.N. auspices with
a view to enabling the indigenous population of the territory to
exercise freely its right to self-determination. 31
Although this resolution reaffirms the right to self-
determination, there is no reference to territorial integrity or
independence in it.'" This may be explained by the fact that
the Spanish Sahara was considered partly as a colonial en-
clave, because of its sparse nomadic population possessing very
little understanding of concepts such as territory and sover-
eignty, and partly as a territory large enough for independence
if not for its small population. Were it not for its character as
a colonial enclave, interested parties would not have been
granted standing for referendum negotiations, but had it been
considered only a colonial enclave, no plebiscite would have
been recommended at all.4
The Sahara's right to independence as a mini-state, made
questionable by United Nations resolutions and its own scanty
population, is further complicated by the differing views of the
interested parties to the dispute. President Boumedienne of
Algeria has stated that his country has no territorial claims to
the area, but wants to insure that independence actually oc-
curs. "Algeria, which accepted the principle of self-
determination when it was at the peak of its own armed revolu-
tion, cannot abandon this principle now."42 King Hassan of
Morocco vehemently disagrees with this assessment. He has
stated that "it is unthinkable for the Sahara to be independent,
and it will not be as long as one Moroccan remains alive. By
bringing it back to Morocco we make it independent; by letting
it become independent we prepare for another colonization.
The only independence for the Sahara is to be rejoined to the
mother country."4 Morocco has opposed a referendum on the
grounds that the majority of the population is nomadic, and
would be largely absent from the territory at any one time. This
would leave the sedentary population to vote, which Morocco
believes is mostly either of Spanish stock or pro-Algerian."
39. Id. at 173.
40. Id.
41. SUREDA, supra note 15, at 215.
42. Enahoro, supra note 1, at 10.
43. Id. at 13.
44. Id.
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Perhaps the most important, if often ignored, views are
those of the people of the Sahara, who are divided on the shape
their future should take. The Sahoul National Union Party
(PUNS), created by the Spanish, is of little current influence,
but there is now a rivalry between the Algerian-supported
Frente Polisario (Sahara Popular Liberation Front) and the
Moroccan-supported FLUS (United Liberation Forces of the
Sahara)." Frente Polisario is demanding total independence
and self-determination, without supervision from neighboring
states. Its membership is broadly based, and it is thought to
be widely supported by the population. Oali Mustapha Siyed,
Secretary-General of Frente Polisario, has stated that he may
be willing to accept a U.N. referendum, but only on his terms."
As of March 21, 1976, Saharans who had remained in
Aiun, the capital of the new territory of Western Sahara, after
the takeover by Morocco and Mauritania, stated that they
strongly opposed any overseer for the territory. They expressed
no reluctance to take weapons from Algeria, and, one said,
"we'll keep fighting for independence until the last Saharan is
wiped off the desert."47 These were ordinary people of the terri-
tory, perhaps the final arbiters of their country's fate. What-
ever the final result, it indicates that self-determination is not
an easily applied principle, whether a legal right or merely a
political doctrine. Like all principles of international law, it
constantly needs reevaluation in the light of such events as the
march on the Sahara.
B. Aggression and Coercion
It has been said that colonialism is permanent aggression,
and therefore that colonialists not only have no rights with
respect to their territories, but also have no standing to protest
any aggression aimed at the liberation of those territories." The
issue cannot be disposed of so easily, however. The recent
United Nations Definition of Agression, other official pro-
nouncements, and theories of nonviolent coercion need to be
examined before the unique Sahara march can be defined, and
these theories tested.
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id.
47. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1976, at 5, col. 1.
48. Emerson, supra note 22, at 465.
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The concept of aggression "presently incorporates such an
expansive set of moral, legal, and political connotations so as
to be essentially devoid of conceptual clarity."" Nonetheless,
attempts began to define the concept in the 1930's with the
League of Nations. The lack of such a definition made determi-
nation of the legality of State action extremely difficult. The
United Nations Charter contains several references to the use
of force. Article 2(4) requires all members to "refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence of any State
.... ." The one exception to this rule is in Article 51, which
preserves "the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations. . . ." Usually, wars of "agitation, infiltration
and subversion" carried on by national liberation movements
are considered to be too small to be effectively dealt with by
Article 51. 0 Although Article 39 calls for examination by the
Security Council of any "threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression," the United Nations has usually
intervened only when overt hostilities have occurred. Interven-
tion of tribunals such as the International Court of Justice
usually occurs after the overt hostilities have ceased.
51
As the responses of international institutions are not im-
mediate, national officials must often act without their guid-
ance when aggression is threatened or occurs. As neither the
direct participants nor the international bodies had sufficient
guidelines for their actions, a definition of aggression was seen
as a necessity, and efforts continued by the United Nations.
The 1973 attempt recognized for the first time that a listing of
aggressive acts should include indirect forms of aggression.
There was much disagreement as to the relationship between
the lawful use of force and the right of self-determination."2
The United Nations Special Committee on the Question
of Defining Aggression, and subsequently the General Assem-
49. Comment, The United Nations Definition of Aggression: A Preliminary
Analysis, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 171, 172 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
50. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809, 812 (1970).
51. Comment, supra note 49, at 181.
52. Ferencz, Defining Aggression-The Last Mile, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
430, 432 (1973).
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bly, finally approved a Definition of Aggression in 1974.13 Sev-
eral provisions of both the Preamble and the substantive arti-
cles are of direct relevance to the issue at hand. Paragraph 6
of the Preamble reaffirms "the duty of States not to use armed
force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination,
freedom, and independence, or to disrupt territorial integrity."
The next paragraph reaffirms
that the territory of a State shall not be violated by being the
object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other mea-
sures of force taken by another State in contravention of the
Charter, and that it shall not be the object of acquisition by
another State resulting from such measures or the threat thereof.
Article 1 contains the generic definition of aggression:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity, or political independence of another
State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations, as set out in this definition."
In an explanatory note, it is stated that the term "state" is used
"without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a
State is a member of the United Nations," and that the term
"includes the concept of a 'group of states' where applicable.""
By Article 2 of the definition, "the first use of armed force
by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute
prima facie evidence of an act of aggression," although the
Security Council may decide that the presumption is rebutted
by other circumstances, including the fact that the situation is
not "of sufficient gravity." 11 The word "armed" indicates that
only the most serious coercive situations are covered by the
definition. "The implicit dimension reflected in this compro-
mise is the ever present problem of achieving international
consensus in a context which has significant political
implications. ,,57
Acts which constitute aggression are listed in Article 3 of
the definition. Among these are territorial invasion or attack,
and any resulting occupation or annexation; and indirect ag-
53. See Report of the Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression,
29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9619 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Report of the
Special Committeel; Comment, supra note 49, at 171.
54. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 53, at 11.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Id. at 11.
57. Comment, supra note 49, at 190.
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gression, meaning one state allowing its territory to be used by
another for an aggressive act against a third state, or the send-
ing of armed bands to perpetrate armed force against another
state. 8 Article 5 declares that "No consideration of whatever
nature, whether political, economic, military, or otherwise,
may serve as a justification for aggression," and further states
that "No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting
from aggression are or shall be recognized as lawful." Article 7
reaffirms the right of self-determination."
As a test of this Definition of Aggression, the uniqueness
of the Moroccan march demands flexibility of interpretation.
Although the use of the term "armed" throughout the defini-
tion may be only an indicator of the level of aggression, rather
than an explicit requirement for it, the unarmed Moroccans do
not, at a superficial level, fit the definition at all. It can be
claimed, however, that the purpose of the march was, to some
extent, to deprive the people of the territory of "their right to
self-determination, freedom, and independence .... ",0
Though they were actually present in the territory for only
three days, the marchers might have constituted a "military
occupation," and the territory most certainly was "the object
of acquisition by another State ... "6, If the unarmed aspect
is ignored, the generic definition contained in Article 1 can be
seen as applicable to the incident, especially as the caveat to
the Article decreases the importance of the fact that the Span-
ish Sahara was not an independent state at the time of the
march.
Although there were Spanish troops waiting for the march-
58. Report of the Special Committee, supra note 53, at 37, 40; Comment, supra
note 49, at 194.
59. Article 7 reads as follows:
Nothing in this definition, and in particular Article 3, could in any
way prejudice the right to self-determination, freedom and independence,
as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and
referred to in the Declaration of Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial or
racist regimes or other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these
peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive support, in accord-
ance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-
mentioned Declaration.
60. Para. 6 of Preamble to Definition.
61. Para. 7 of Preamble to Definition.
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ers inside the border of the Sahara, the Moroccans committed
the first forceful act, which constituted prima facie evidence of
aggression under Article 2 of the definition. Under Article 3, the
act could be seen as a territorial invasion ultimately resulting
in annexation, or as indirect aggression, by the sending of, in
this case unarmed, bands to perpetrate force against another
state. Article 5 recognizes neither political nor economic con-
siderations as justifications for aggression. If this was indeed
aggression, King Hassan's reasons for his action, which were
entirely political and economic, are unusable as justifications.
Furthermore, his "territorial acquisition" and the "special ad-
vantage" which he gained are not recognized as lawful under
the same Article.
6 2
Finally, Article 7, a strong statement of the right to self-
determination and an important exception to the prohibition
of aggression, is condemnatory of the Moroccan march if it is
seen as an action taken to suppress the self-determination of
the Saharans. The Frente Polisario and Algeria would certainly
view it in this way. If seen as an action taken to preserve the
independence of the Saharans, however, the march would be
an exception to the prohibition of aggression. Morocco and
Mauritania, using Hassan's unique interpretation of independ-
ence, would support this view. As can be seen from this analy-
sis, the Definition of Aggression is helpful, but not fully applic-
able to this particular situation. Other theoretical formula-
tions, some of them amplifications of Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter, may be useful in delineating the aggressive
and coercive aspects of the Moroccan march.
If one looks at the march as more of a test of nerve than a
test of force, a brinksmanship theory provides an interesting
analysis. In brinksmanship, a contest of nerves, there is a
premium on "the quick fait accompli that leaves the other side
the choice of acquiescing or initiating some large act of violence
... .If one can arrange it so that the last clear chance to avert
disaster falls to the adversary, he is the one who is deterred
.. "'3 This is a precise description of the tactic that Hassan
used in gaining a diplomatic advantage while his adversaries
62. Article 5 of Definition.
63. Schelling, The Threat of Violence in International Affairs, 57 AM. Soc. INT'L
L. PROC. 103, 106 (1973).
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were understandably reluctant to start a full-scale war in re-
sponse to his action. An additional aspect of the theory is that
what is in dispute is not only the immediate aim of the action,
but also the expectations of the parties concerned about the
future behavior of each participant.64 Hassan no doubt knew
that he would not gain the Spanish Sahara by means of his
unarmed marchers, but he successfully demonstrated the un-
yielding strength of his desire for the territory.
The marchers themselves may be considered as volun-
teers, or as an armed band, in the application of established
theory. As volunteers, their actions would not have been con-
sidered aggression by the state of their origin if they had been
merely mercenaries. However, they were recruited, and the
"government exhortation" precluded their nation's exclusion
from the principle of aggression.15 The marchers fit more pre-
cisely into the definition of an armed band, if, again, their
unarmed status is overlooked. Under this theory, "the organi-
zation, with governmental complicity, of armed bands of
emigres or other irregular groups on national territory, for in-
cursion into the territory of another State or States" consti-
tutes aggression.6 There are numerous treaty and municipal
law provisions dealing with frontier raiding by such bands, and
the prohibition of hostile expeditions is viewed as a legal duty
in State practice. 7 Thus, it would seem that Hassan's marchers
violated an international norm, as well as part of the formal
Definition of Aggression.
It has been suggested that Article 2(4) of the United Na-
tions Charter may be flexible enough, itself, to apply to coer-
cion other than traditional armed force. Subversion or partici-
pation in internal struggle for power, if the intervention threat-
ens the political independence of the victim, would seem to be
as much a prohibited use or threat of force as an armed at-
64. Id.
65. Brownlie, Volunteers and the Law of War and Neutrality, 5 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 570, 571 (1956).
66. Brownlie, International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands, 7 INT'L &
COMp. L. Q. 712, at 712 (1958).
67. Id. at 724. See e.g., Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance between Iraq and
Transjordan, Apr. 14, 1947, 23 U.N.T.S. 147; Agreement for Friendship and Neigh-
borly Relations between the United Kingdom on behalf of the Sheikh of Koweit and
Saudi Arabia, Apr. 20, 1942, 10 U.N.T.S. 117; Treaty of Friendship between Egypt and
Yemen, Sept. 27, 1945, 9 U.N.T.S. 373.
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tack. 8 More strongly stated, the interpretation of "force" as
including political and economic coercion is a necessary inter-
pretation "in view of the potentially disastrous consequences
that may attend a rigid adherence to the narrower prohibition
of simple armed force.""9 This theory recognizes hierarchies of
coercion in its nature, its intensity, and its purpose. As to its
nature, there are three levels: military force; intermediate coer-
cion, including ideological persuasion and the fomenting of
civil strife by organized bands; and economic and political
coercion, including diplomacy, boycotts, and embargoes. A
judgment on the permissibility of such action must take into
account the intensity of the coercion "in relation to the in-
tended goal and the degree of provocation," and the purpose
of the coercion, as the Charter allows the resort to force only
in self-defense or as part of a United Nations enforcement ac-
tion. 0
If these hierarchies of coercion are recognized, the analysis
of aggression and coercion becomes much more flexible, and
Article 2(4) remains effective as "a behavioral norm." The cur-
rent necessity for this may be seen by the search for a definition
of aggression, international treaties that refer to non-military
coercion, and General Assembly resolutions that do the same.7'
For example, the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissability of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protec-
tion of Their Independence and Sovereignty states that "no
State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to
obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights or to secure from it advantages of any kind."12 The inclu-
sion of economic and political coercion within Article 2(4)'s
proscription may thus be seen as an increasingly perceived
necessity "to develop among nations a commitment to refrain
from these forms of force.
'7 3
68. Henkin, Force, Intervention and Neutrality in Contemporary International
Law, 57 Am. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 147, 158 (1963).
69. Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality Under Article
2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 988 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Nonviolent Coercion].
70. Id. at 992.
71. Id. at 999.
72. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
73. Nonviolent Coercion, supra note 69, at 1006.
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Applied to the Sahara situation, this theory allows a more
subtle and relevant analysis than the simple armed
force/noncoercion dichotomy. In the hierarchies of coercion, the
march can be classified as political coercion, with enough in-
tensity to threaten a full-scale war and with the intention to
annex a territory, and as having an impermissible purpose,
being neither a defensive nor a U.N. enforcement action. Al-
though certainly not a typical confrontation, the Moroccan
march may be indicative of a modern trend, recognized by
treaties and resolutions, towards the use of nonviolent coercion
by smaller states who, by virtue of their relative lack of military
power, must turn to other means to attain their perhaps unlaw-
ful goals. If international law is to remain an important influ-
ence on the world order, it must be flexible enough to define
and deal with such disruptive behavior as the march on the
Sahara.
C. "Non-Legal" Factors in International Law
There are several factors influencing the meaning and ap-
plication of international law which have a particular bearing
on the case at hand. These include collective psychology and
the dynamics of non-Western societies and new states.
The closest historical analogy to the Saharan march, in
terms of its psychological dynamics, is the medieval Crusades.
A reaction to them would fit the march as well: "One marvels
at the fantastic heights of devotion to which old and young,
rich and poor, well-born and base-born were occasionally able
to ascend."74 Other manifestations of collective psychology
have emerged throughout history, witch-burnings and revolu-
tionary mobs among them, and they have influenced interna-
tional law in several ways. Crowd actions have initiated contro-
versies and have influenced the identification of the parties to
the dispute, their claims, the justifications for the claims, and
the ultimate outcome. 5 Collective psychological factors have
particularly influenced crises connected with the emergence of
nation-states. They may arise spontaneously, or be incited by
a charismatic leader. Political elites may protect their own
74. Lasswell, The Impact of Crowd Psychology Upon International Law, 9 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 664, 665 (1968).
75. Id. at 669.
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positions by directing frustration and hatred toward foreign
targets.76
Although carefully managed by King Hassan, the march
was a true exercise in crowd psychology. The crowds of Moroc-
cans who answered his exhortation may not have had any
inkling of the precise political reason for the march, but the
call to a crusade was too exciting for thousands of them to
resist. Their collective psychology was a major factor in the
delineation of the dispute and its ultimate outcome. And Has-
san's reign, which had never been particularly secure, gained
a measure of support far greater than it had ever known, as the
frustrations of the Moroccan people were directed toward an
entrancing vision of national glory.
Another important factor in the genesis of the march may
have been the ethnic and political composition of the partici-
pant nations. As a traditional Islamic monarchy, "the inter-
play of politics in Morocco is characterized by a marked ambi-
guity" of objectives. Islam and traditional values often are used
to justify these ambiguous goals.77 The essential Moroccan ter-
ritorial thesis, for example, equates the old Islamic tradition of
the community owing allegiance to a particular descendant of
ancient rulers and the modern theory of the nation-state." On
the other hand, Algeria is an emerging leader of the Third
World, an Islamic nation, but committed to socialism and
modernization. It may not be possible for such opposing politi-
cal systems to successfully settle territorial disputes without
violence or threats.
As newly-independent and non-Western states, the partic-
ipants in the dispute may be expected to apply international
law and norms differently than a long-established Western
European state would. The recently emerged African states
tend to approach international law conservatively. Regional
disputes are usually resolved through political processes rather
than by means of international law.7" When they do accede to
international legal principles, it is the result of a careful choice,
76. Id. at 677.
77. M. BRETT, NORTHERN AFRICA: ISLAM AND MODERNIZATION 125 (1973).
78. CURRAN, supra note 7, at 98.
79. Spencer, The Impact of International Law on Political and Social Processes
Within the African Context, 66 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 56, at 56 (1972).
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rather than automatic acceptance. The concept of sovereignty
is of great importance, and they are reluctant to accept any
limitation of it. Their attitude toward international organiza-
tions is ambivalent, as they often need advice from outside
sources, but they are reluctant to become dependent on such
aid. 
8 0
As to the sources of international law, new states are un-
willing to accept rules of state succession, which "provide that
a new state is bound by all the general rules of international
law which were in force at the time of its creation, regardless
of their source."'" Treaties are generally more acceptable than
customary international law. The "general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" and unilateral acts of organi-
zations such as the General Assembly are important as sources
of law because the new nations can more easily contribute to
the development of international law by these means. 2 As to
the subjects of international law, most new states do not sup-
port the recognition of individuals as such, fearing the encour-
agement of secessionist groups. The concept of territory is val-
ued as a legal shield against incursions from the outside. There
is a liberal attitude toward recognition, which usually does not
arise except for former colonies. The doctrine of state responsi-
bility is unacceptable as "a cloak for imperialism by investor
countries." 3 Because of this selective interpretation of interna-
tional law, the newly-independent states are reluctant to ac-
cept compulsory jurisdiction of international judicial bodies.
The acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction "implies the accept-
ance of the substantive rules." Without the possibility of appli-
cation by an adjudicative organ, the rules themselves lose
value. 4
International law began as a body of generalizations from
state behavior in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Euro-
pean state system. If these generalizations are allowed to be-
come moral ideals which states must be forced to accept, it will
become totally inapplicable to the present world order. In-
80. Abi-Saab, The Newly Independent States and the Rules of International Law:
An Outline, 8 How. L. J. 75, 103 (1962).
81. Id. at 105.
82. Id. at 109.
83. Id. at 114.
84. Id. at 119.
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stead, international law should be viewed as consisting of "the
patterns in state behavior that exist in a particular place at a
particular time and which have no necessary moral status."85
Norms are likely to remain stable if there is a low level of social
change, but the rate of change has greatly accelerated since the
principles of international law were first formulated. In order
to adjust to the quickly changing world, the international legal
system must never assume that contemporary political and
social processes are constants, to which a body of law may be
steadfastly and permanently applied."
In their choice of international legal theories, norms, and
institutions, the non-Western, newly-independent states not
only demonstrate an increasing skill at adapting an essentially
foreign legal system to their own situations, but also illustrate
the need for international law to keep abreast of social and
political currents. The participants in the Sahara incident ex-
hibited this selective application of international law in their
attitudes toward the independence and self-determination of
the Spanish Sahara, and especially in their vacillation with
regard to the use of international organizations such as the
United Nations and the International Court of Justice. The
effectiveness of these organizations in dealing with the problem
presented to them by these non-Western states is another as-
pect which needs to be examined.
D. International Organizations
The announcement of the march on the Sahara was made
almost immediately after the International Court of Justice
announced that Morocco had no valid legal claim to the terri-
tory. Of course, the march had been planned for several weeks
previously, but the timing indicates both the importance of the
decision and the International Court's effectiveness as an arbi-
ter of international disputes.
That the dispute came before the Court at all is an excep-
tional circumstance. A state's decision to accept jurisdiction of
the Court is a political one, influenced by certain aspects of
international law and society. 7 Several factors inhibit recourse
85. Barkun, International Norms as Facts and Ideals, 66 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC.
39, 42 (1972).
86. Id. at 46.
87. Merrills, The Justiciability of International Disputes, 47 CAN. B. REV. 241, 242
(1969).
1976
116 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
to the International Court. The possibility of an adverse verdict
cannot be accepted when vital interests are at stake. A state
which loses its case not only has had its legal arguments de-
feated, but its political position has thereby been weakened. If
international law is seen by the states concerned as a reflection
of European values, this may lead them to reject settlement by
the application of that law. 8 It may be a greater advantage for
one party to take possession of the subject matter of the dispute
by an exercise of power. Finally, it may be a severe disadvan-
tage to the state to have the legal merits of its case publicly
determined. In short, compulsory jurisdiction "circumscribes a
State's freedom of action." 9
Although political questions are ordinarily regarded as not
justiciable by the Court, it may be more helpful to consider the
political nature of the Court itself. Article 92 of the United
Nations Charter constitutes the International Court as the
"principal judicial organ" of the United Nations, thus making
it an integral part of a political phenomenon. 0 The separation
of international disputes into political and legal ones, by this
theory, is itself artificial, as they are all at least partially politi-
cal. The nature of the Court's political task, a difficult one,
may thus be seen as
isolation of the legal problem from the political circumstances in
which it originates; consequent reduction of tensions between
states; and solution of the legal problem on the bases of objective
and even abstract examinations, to the exclusion of all political,
moral, or extralegal considerations.9'
While the Court has almost unlimited power to answer a
request on any legal question, the propriety of rendering an
opinion when noncompliance is a certainty may be questiona-
ble.9 2 Compliance with its decisions is a major problem for the
Court, which by its nature as an international tribunal has no
power of action against nations. Enforcement of its judgment
rests with the Security Council by Article 94 of the Charter.93
88. Id. at 256.
89. Id. at 268.
90. Doeker, International Politics and the International Court of Justice, 35 TUL.
L. REV. 767, 773 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Doeker].
91. Id. at 785.
92. Schwartz, The International Court's Role as an Advisor to the United Nations,
37 B.U. L. REV. 404, 427 (1957).
93. Deutsch, Problems of Enforcement of Decrees of International Tribunals, 50
A.B.A.J. 1134, 1135 (1964) (hereinafter cited as Deutsch].
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However, a violation of the Court's decree by invasion of dis-
puted territory would unquestionably constitute aggres-
sion-to the breach of international peace would be added the
violation of a precedent judicial adjudication. Therefore, while
it has no power of enforcement of its own, the Court by its
decision aids in delineating the extent of the aggression. 4
It is difficult to understand why Morocco initiated the
process of submitting the Saharan issue before the Court. Sev-
eral of the inhibiting factors were present-the interests at
stake made an adverse verdict unacceptable, and the Moroc-
can political position would have been severely weakened if it
were not for the march. An exercise of power became of much
greater advantage. If Hassan had chosen to follow the Court's
opinion, his freedom of action would have ceased to exist. Al-
though the Court treated the dispute as a legal issue, it was
never depoliticized sufficiently by the parties involved to per-
mit them to accept an objective examination. Particularly in
this case, the probability of noncompliance was so great as to
make the Court's deliberations an exercise in futility. However,
it did add to the strength of the characterization of the march
as an aggression.
Although the United Nations, as an international political
organization, would seem to be better equipped to deal with
highly politicized situations, its response to and effectiveness
in this incident are indicative of several problems.
It was originally intended by the United Nations Charter
that the General Assembly would be limited primarily to rec-
ommendatory powers. In recent years the Assembly has taken
on more responsibility as the Security Council "has failed to
promote the aims of the Charter" due to the frequent use of the
veto and the antagonisms between East and West." The fre-
quent General Assembly resolutions on such issues as aggres-
sion and self-determination have been a powerful tool in shap-
ing international norms. Although not binding, in certain con-
texts a series of resolutions "assumes a prescriptive or quasi-
legislative role by generating a consensus that it constitutes a
source of law binding on all parties."9 The Security Council
94. Id. at 1136.
95. Note, supra note 25, at 550.
96. Id. at 552.
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has also been reluctant to submit requests to the International
Court of Justice for advisory opinions, but again, the General
Assembly has seen fit to use this method of problem-solving.
Advisory opinions are not binding, but they are of great pres-
tige and often politically persuasive. 7 In dealing with self-
determination questions, the United Nations has particular
difficulties, due to the fact that states are almost always the
only international persons recognizable by it. Unless individu-
als are recognized, it is practically impossible to hear griev-
ances of secessionist groups and oppressed minorities. 8
The enforcement process is the most important, and the
most problem-ridden, of the United Nations' functions. The
attitude in which the U.N. delegations approach the task of
enforcement, the unavailability of information as to the merits
of each party's case, and the limitations of time "all militate
against an informed and dispassionate examination of the legal
obligations of the parties," with the aim of determining which
party violated the law. 9 The Security Council or General As-
sembly may call upon nations to refrain from aiding or furnish-
ing supplies to the participants in a conflict, and may protest
excessive force, even if used in self-defense.""° After the Interna-
tional Court of Justice renders an opinion, enforcement by the
Security Council "is, in effect, a new dispute to be resolved
politically." The Security Council may, by examination of the
entire political setting of the dispute, decide that the weight of
the judicial decree is less than that of other considerations. 0'
The Security Council's enforcement function is discretionary,
not obligatory. One possible, although extreme, measure would
be the enforcement of Article 5 of the Charter, which states:
A member of the United Nations against which preventive or
enforcement action has been taken by the Security Council may
be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of
membership by the General Assembly on recommendation of the
Security Council. 01
97. Doeker, supra note 90, at 785.
98. Note, supra note 25, at 558.
99. Baxter, The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use of Force Under the
Charter, 62 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 68, 71 (1968).
100. Id. at 74.
101. Deutsch, supra note 93, at 1135.
102. See id. at 1139.
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Although this last enforcement measure might seem rather
harsh, it would be applicable to Morocco, against which pre-
ventive action had been taken. The Security Council had
called on the parties to avoid unilateral action before the march
occurred, and had the Secretary-General intensify negotia-
tions. During the march, the Security Council requested Mo-
rocco to immediately withdraw from the area.'0 3 Although the
marchers did almost immediately withdraw, it was clearly not
as a result of United Nations' pressure, but because of the
impending confrontation with Spanish troops. The Security
Council's actions did not fully support the International
Court's opinion, as the effort was to negotiate a settlement
between all of the interested parties, ignoring the opinion's
conclusion that Morocco and Mauritania had no legal claim to
the Spanish Sahara. As pointless as a stricter stance might
have been, it remains that the United Nations had almost no
effect on either the confrontation or the ultimate resolution of
the dispute-Spain, Morocco, and Mauritania came to the
agreement among themselves.
IV. CONCLUSION
The key to the Spanish Sahara incident, in terms of its
impact on international law, is the measure of success that
Morocco enjoyed. Amidst vehement protests from a more pow-
erful neighbor, and strongly worded requests from the major
international organizations, Hassan finally received the
valuable piece of desert that he had desired for so long. The
march is a symbol of his victory; it is also a measure of the
applicability of international law and the effectiveness of inter-
national institutions.
If it is not now a definitive legal right, self-determination
is at least a vitally important legal and political principle. Es-
pecially in this highly politicized situation, the implementa-
tion of self-determination would seem to be a highly desired
goal, even if independence were not the final result. Instead,
the march and its repurcussions effectively blocked the Sahar-
ans from exercising, at least for the present, their right of self-
determination.
Although there is still some difficulty in applying theories
103. N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1975, at 13, col. 1.
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of aggression and coercion to the march, the new Definition of
Aggression and recent delineations of nonviolent coercion have
increased the flexibility of the concept. The march was an act
of aggression in the intensity of its political coerciveness, al-
though arrival at this conclusion is made more difficult by the
Definition's insistence on "armed" force.
In addition to prompting traditional legal analysis, the
march demonstrates the applicability of theories formulated
outside the legal framework. Collective psychology, economics,
history, and the cultural and political background of new states
all shape the way in which international incidents manifest
themselves. A long-established Western state would not spon-
sor a crusade, but the march was a logical extension of the
dynamics of Moroccan society.
The United Nations and the International Court of Jus-
tice, as the major vehicles for the application of international
law, have had mixed success in dealing with international
crises. As formulators of international doctrine by way of reso-
lutions and opinions, they have an impressive record; as enfor-
cers of that doctrine, the record is much less impressive. Their
failure to affect the aftermath of the march strongly suggests
the problems in regard to enforcement.
Recommendations are not easily made, as all of these
problems are complex and elusive. However, four general
suggestions can be made, corresponding to the four problem
areas:
1. Continuing efforts should be made to insure that the Sahar-
ans will be afforded the opportunity to determine their own fu-
ture. More generally, U.N. attempts at arranging self-
determination referendums should not be halted by the "one-
time-only" principle or any other inhibiting factor. Disallowing
secession may be comforting to new elites, but it should be imper-
missible as a principle of international law.
2. As a codification of an international legal norm, the Defini-
tion of Aggression is a useful tool. However, it should be broad-
ened to include unarmed force, using as a guide recent theories
of nonviolent coercion. Incidents such as the march may then be
more quickly determined to be aggression, and responded to with
greater decisiveness.
3. An effort should be made to make international law more
responsive to nation-states with perspectives differing from those
upon which international law was founded. It will then be easier
to determine what nation-state behavior to anticipate, and
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whether that behavior violates not merely Western norms, but
basic international norms as well.
4. The United Nations and the International Court of Justice
should work together in their decision-making processes. If the
International Court continues to accept highly politicized dis-
putes, the United Nations should at least follow the Court's deci-
sion in its own actions, if for no other reason than to preserve the
Court's credibility. And in its own actions, the United Nations
should escalate its responses to such incidents by being less hesi-
tant to brand aggression as such, and by maintaining pressure for
more equitable solutions than the present arrangement in the
Sahara.
That Hassan was able to do what he did signifies not only
the imaginativeness of his tactic; it serves as a warning to the
international legal system to maintain the utmost flexibility in
dealing with the quickly changing international order. There
may never again be another crusade, but there will be other
challenges to take the place of the march on the Sahara.
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